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In this essay I re-examine Schelling’s ideas about nature and freedom from a feminist 
perspective. I look at first Schelling’s First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, 
written in 1799-1800, i.e. during his ‘early’ period, then his Philosophical Investigations on 
the Essence of Human Freedom, from 1809, i.e. the beginning of his ‘middle’ period. These 
works differ in philosophical orientation, but there are significant continuities between them, 
including in their assumptions about gender. In both works, Schelling argues that two 
opposed yet interdependent metaphysical powers are necessary to the constitution of the 
world, and he interprets these powers in terms of a gendered polarity. Earlier, the polarity is 
between the natural force of male productivity and that of female inhibition. In the more 
theological framework of the Freiheitsschrift, the polarity is between the primordial, female 
generative power that is God’s ground and the rational, male creative power that is God’s 
existence. 
Feminists have explored how assumptions about gender—about what it means to be 
male or female, a man or a woman—have figured into the history of European philosophy. 
Influential feminist scholars have identified sets of hierarchical oppositions running through 
this tradition—mind versus body, reason versus passion, free will versus natural 
determination. Within these oppositions, the most highly valued poles—mind, reason, 
freedom—have tended to be construed as ‘male’ and the inferior poles as ‘female’ (see, e.g., 
Lloyd 1984). For instance, women have repeatedly been seen as being at the mercy of their 
bodies and bodily impulses and so unable to rise to higher levels of intellectual or spiritual 
achievement—all this partly because the body itself has regularly been interpreted or 
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symbolised as ‘female’. These interpretations are not merely contingent and accidental, such 
that we could retain (say) the concept of the body but deny that the body has any female 
connotations. Rather, gendered interpretations have fed into the inherited meanings of many 
concepts––into our conceptions, if not necessarily our concept, of the body. Inherited 
conceptions can be re-thought and re-imagined, but this requires intellectual and imaginative 
work, not mere assertions that gendered meanings can be set aside. In the absence of that re-
thinking work, when we use inherited concepts we are liable to re-use their sedimented 
gendered meanings as well. 
Feminist historians of philosophy have rarely looked at Schelling’s work (but an 
exception is Assiter 2015). Yet for the last dozen years or so a major rebirth of interest in 
Schelling has been underway. English-language Schelling scholarship is rapidly growing,1 
and an increasing number of theorists beyond Schelling scholars are returning to his ideas, a 
trend spearheaded by Zizek (e.g. 1996). Yet if we wish to bring Schelling’s concepts forward 
into the present day, we need to examine their gendered meanings and ask how far we are 
willing to accept them today. 
As indicated, here I undertake this examination in two stages. First, I look at the 
gendered contrast between natural forces in Schelling’s First Outline. Second, I explain the 
rather different project of the Freiheitsschrift, in which ground and existence have gendered 
connotations continuous with those that inhibition and productivity had in the Outline. By 
reading the two texts together, then, we see a continuous strand in Schelling’s thought. 
Discerning this strand requires that we spend some time reconstructing Schelling’s ideas in 
these two texts, given their complexity and difficulty. Finally, I draw out the ambiguous 
implications of Schelling’s claims as to the relative value of each gender,2 and I consider how 
all this bears on contemporary possibilities for re-appropriating Schelling’s thought, with 
particular reference to Zizek.  
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I. Gender in the First Outline 
I begin by sketching the version of philosophy of nature that Schelling sets out in the First 
Outline. As with Schelling’s preceding versions of this enterprise, it arose in part as a critical 
response to Kant’s view that ordered experience and knowledge are only possible if the 
subject of experience applies categories, centrally including that of causality, to the materials 
of sensation. In turn, for Kant, that application is only possible through the subject’s freedom 
or spontaneity, i.e. its power to perform actions independently of precipitating causes—and, 
notably, to apply categories because their use is warranted on a given occasion rather than 
merely because some causal force in my mind prompts me to do so. In short, knowledge as a 
normative phenomenon is possible only if knowers can act with spontaneity.  
Yet, for Kant, the categories constrain us to experience nature—including ourselves 
insofar as we are part of nature—as a realm of objects whose interactions are causally 
determined in the manner theorized by Newtonian physics. How then can we exist and act as 
free subjects, and gain knowledge, within a natural universe in which all events are entirely 
causally determined? Part of Kant’s answer is that ordered experience and knowledge require 
not that we actually are free but only that we can, indeed must, assume that we are free. In 
the Critique of Judgment, Kant further suggests that this requires us also to think of 
organisms, and of nature as an organized whole, as if they were ‘purposive’—self-organizing 
in ways that prefigure the mind’s capacity for ordering its own experience. Nevertheless, for 
Kant this is only a way of thinking about nature and organisms. We cannot know whether or 
not nature or organisms in themselves, independently of how we represent them, really are 
purposive (Kant [1790] 1987: §65-§67, 255-9). Our judgments of purposiveness are only 
‘regulative’, not ‘constitutive’ (§67, 259). 
Schelling, in contrast, argues that we as subjects of cognitive experience must really 
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be free if we are to know the world, and that this freedom is only possible if nature really is 
spontaneous as well, independently of our thought about it: ‘the purposiveness of natural 
products dwells in themselves, . . .  it is objective and real’ (IPN 32/96).3 Nature as a whole 
must exhibit a level of freedom or spontaneity of its own, otherwise human subjects, situated 
amidst nature as they are, could never possess freedom either. Of course nature is not free in 
the same manner as human subjects, and neither are non-human organisms, but they must still 
have features that approximate to human freedom at a lower level, centrally including the 
power of self-organisation. The project of philosophy of nature, then, is to understand both 
the details and the overall manner in which freedom is prefigured within nature. ‘To 
philosophise about nature means to lift it out of dead mechanism … to animate it with 
freedom and to set it into its own free development’ (FO 14/79). This is a question of 
describing how nature really, mind-independently is—for nature must really exhibit forms of 
proto-freedom if human beings are really to have freedom, as they must do to be capable of 
gaining knowledge as they are. 
 Scientists of Schelling’s time, however, often understood natural beings in 
mechanistic terms, as composed of units of matter caught up in chains of efficient causation. 
Schelling therefore re-interprets natural forms and processes to reveal how, after all, they 
exhibit varying levels of self-organization. But Schelling does not simply devise an account 
of nature of his own which has no relation to scientific findings. On the contrary, he 
constructs his account of nature by drawing on the sciences of his time, but re-interpreting 
their findings in light of his overall metaphysics of free nature, or highlighting those 
particular findings that agree with his stance, identifying these as the most advanced or best 
scientific views. 
Taking issue with Newtonian atomism in particular, Schelling takes it to be 
established by the better scientific theories of his time that matter is not fundamental but 
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composed of prior attractive and repulsive forces: 
Dynamic chemistry … admits no original matter whatever—no matter, that is, from 
which everything else would have arisen by composition [as in Newtonian atomism]. 
On the contrary, since it considers all matter originally as a product of opposed forces 
(entgegengesetzter Kräfte), the greatest possible diversity of matter is still nothing else 
but a diversity in the relationship of these forces. (IPN 221/252) 
Because these two forces structure matter, it prefigures subjectivity. The subject is always 
oriented both towards outer objects in the world, about which it tries to know, and back into 
itself inasmuch as whenever we know we are, necessarily, implicitly aware that we are doing 
so, self-referentially. The subject is attracted to know about objects in the world outside it 
and to repel these objects (as external to it) insofar as it returns reflexively into itself (IPN 
176/214-5). The subject, then, is structured by a higher-level development of the same 
opposition between forces of attraction (or expansion) and repulsion (contraction) which we 
find in matter, right down to its lowest atomic level. Reciprocally, matter prefigures 
subjectivity. This is one instance of how Schelling thought that the sciences of his time could 
be interpreted as showing that nature anticipates free subjectivity.  
In the Ideas, then, Schelling saw nature as organized by two fundamental forces: 
attraction, which is outward-oriented and expansive, and repulsion, which is inward-oriented 
and withdrawing. These forces organise matter, and from matter the whole gamut of natural 
phenomena is built up. In the First Outline, Schelling reconceives these two forces as those 
of production and inhibition. 
Production has priority in the First Outline, since Schelling’s overarching thesis here 
is that nature is originally productive. It originally consists of sheer, unlimited, productive 
activity (unendliche productive Tätigkeit). This productivity ‘limits’ (fixirt) itself to constitute 
the various particular products and processes that people the natural world. These products, 
 6 
Schelling insists, are not permanently fixed entities but only transitory resting points within 
nature’s productivity—akin to eddies in a stream (FO 32/98). According to Schelling, the 
mistake of mechanistic science is to overlook the underlying productivity, ‘the inner driving 
activity [Triebwerk]’ (IO 196/32), which first makes possible the finite products, i.e. material 
units and their compositions, that this kind of science studies. Schelling, in contrast, aims to 
re-interpret the various finite natural products studied by the sciences as manifestations of 
nature’s free productivity. In this way, once again, he discerns a kind of proto-freedom within 
nature—its productivity, which prefigures human spontaneity. 
To explain how nature’s productivity becomes confined in particular products, 
Schelling argues thus. Infinitely active as it is, nature’s productivity would pass through an 
endless array of products infinitely quickly, destroying each product as quickly as it had been 
created, unless that productivity encountered some ‘retarding’ force (FO 187/266). Thus, the 
distinction between productivity and products must be explained by a prior duality of 
forces—a duality of productivity and another force opposing it. In Schelling’s analogy, a 
river only forms eddies when its flow encounters resistance (IO 206/45-6). So, a force of 
inhibition—Hemmung—must oppose nature’s productivity, so that particular products arise 
from the conflictual balance between productive and inhibiting forces. ‘Each formation is 
itself only the . . . appearance of a determinate proportion which nature achieves between 
opposed, mutually limiting actions’ (FO 35/101). 
Each natural ‘product’, then, is structured by a polarity: it reflects at once a given 
level of productivity and a given level of inhibition. For example, within the process whereby 
two elements interact chemically with one another, the point at which they react and 
exchange components embodies the moment when productive force prevails over the fixed 
‘products’ in which it had been combined. But in that such reactions generate new ‘products’, 
say oxides, inhibiting force has once again come into play, binding productivity into a new 
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finite shape. 
For Schelling, a hierarchical series of natural forms arises within nature: every time 
productivity becomes bound into some specific range of entities, it bursts beyond this shape, 
but then becomes re-inhibited once more. Yet on each such occasion, productivity is spurred 
to display a higher level of freedom-cum-activity in its new effort to move beyond its 
preceding limitations, so that the products of nature become more and more organised and 
self-organising as we ascend the series. Chemical processes, for example, exhibit more 
activity and self-organisation than the efficient-causal interactions of bare units of matter. 
Living beings and their interactions exhibit still more activity and self-organisation.  
The gendered connotations of these claims finally come into the open when, in his 
account of living beings—i.e. animals, including human beings, and plants—Schelling 
discusses sexual difference, Geschlechtsverschiedenheit. He understands the latter as follows. 
Nature overall can produce only when its two forces co-operate—when productivity acts, yet 
is hemmed in to some definite manifestation. In turn, if members of a living species are to 
reproduce, this is possible only if they partake in both the force of productivity and that of 
inhibition—producing something new that is nonetheless a determinate set of offspring. To 
the extent that both forces are prerequisites of reproduction, sexual difference is necessary, so 
that: ‘Throughout the whole of [organic] nature absolute sexlessness is nowhere 
demonstrable’ (FO 36/102). This makes it explicit, retrospectively, that productivity and 
inhibition have gendered connotations. If this were not so, then the fact that the two forces are 
necessary for organic reproduction would not entail that organic reproduction requires sexual 
difference. 
However, it does not necessarily follow that the two forces should always be 
distributed asymmetrically between two distinct members of the species. Sometimes, in 
plants, a single individual can embody both forces. But in mammals, including human beings, 
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the forces are divided between two individuals, so that these beings realise sexual difference 
properly. ‘The separation into different sexes is just the [same] separation which we have 
furnished as the ground of inhibition in the productions of nature’ (FO 39/105)—i.e., the 
female sex exists distinct from the male, just as inhibition must differ from, yet co-operate 
with, productivity. By implication, the female sex and inhibition go together, and so do the 
male sex and productivity. 
The same assumption comes out when Schelling interprets sexual difference in terms 
of the difference between ‘receptivity’ and ‘irritability’ as John Brown understood them. On 
Brown’s then-influential medical theory, disease arises from a mismatch between an 
individual’s inherent level of ‘irritability’ and the level of stimulation impacting on them 
from the outer environment. Schelling interprets irritability as a manifestation of productive 
force and receptivity as a manifestation of inhibiting force. In his view, children are highly 
susceptible to stimulation—highly receptive—but are low in irritability: i.e., in children 
inhibiting force prevails over the productive force. He adds: 
If the organic power of resistance increases, the movements become more 
forceful, more energetic too—in equal proportion to the sinking sensibility.—Or, 
one might observe the difference of the sexes, or the climatic differences of 
peoples, or finally the increase of the forces directed outwardly in nature, which 
also happen in a certain (inverse) relation to sensibility. (FO 169/240-1) 
Sexual difference, then, is illustrative of how sensibility (and inhibition) may prevail over 
irritability (and productivity), in happens in women as in children—while conversely, in more 
forceful and energetic people (i.e. men), irritability may reassert itself against sensibility.  
In understanding productivity and inhibition in gendered terms, Schelling is building 
on a long philosophical history. Although Schelling’s conception of these forces is all his 
own, he calls productivity nature’s ‘subjectivity’ (IO 202/41)—it is that in virtue of which 
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nature is active, creative, potent, and foreshadows human spontaneity. Conversely inhibition 
is cast in terms of withdrawal, passivity, and interiority. These connotations map closely onto 
the old association of men with activity and women with passivity, but also with the gender 
division of social roles that was crystallising in Schelling’s time, with women confined to the 
‘interior’ realm of the household whereas men ‘go out’ into the active domains of work and 
politics. 
Here we should recall, too, the enormous influence on Schelling of his 1974 readings 
of Plato’s cosmological dialogue the Timaeus.4 For Plato, the construction of the cosmos 
depends on the existence of the formless, primal, material space that he calls chora and 
explicitly describes in feminine terms, as the ‘receptacle’ and nurse of generation. For Plato, 
the cosmos as a structured realm arises from the interaction between form and primal matter. 
This view influenced Schelling’s belief that two opposed yet co-operating forces are needed 
to generate the natural world. The place of the chora in Plato’s Timaeus corresponds to that 
of the inhibiting, withdrawing, contracting force that Schelling identifies within nature—a 
force that carries over the feminine connotations that the chora had for Plato. 
 
II. Gender in the Freiheitsschrift 
Schelling’s philosophical standpoint in the Freiheitsschrift differs markedly from that of the 
Outline, but this does not represent a sharp break in his thought. Rather, Schelling’s previous 
positions generated particular problems, and his efforts to solve these led him to the 
significantly modified views that we find expressed in the Freiheitsschrift.  
To elaborate: When he was developing his philosophy of nature, Schelling 
simultaneously also worked on his ‘transcendental philosophy’: his account of subjectivity 
and its forms, which realise at increasingly advanced levels the power of self-determination 
already prefigured in nature. However, Schelling was not convinced that he had adequately 
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understood how nature and subjectivity belong together as two modes of a single ultimate 
reality. Thus, in 1801 he adumbrated the ‘identity philosophy’, focusing directly on the 
absolute as a unity and how its unity grounds these different manifestations in nature and 
mind. This stance generated a host of questions about how to understand the relation between 
the absolute one and the many finite differences.  
These, along with several other intersecting questions, led to the revised set of 
formulations set out in the Freiheitsschrift. One of these further questions concerns the 
character of human freedom, which, Schelling became increasingly insistent, consists in the 
capacity to choose between good and evil as two equally possible options. That is, evil is not 
merely a lack of goodness, and more specifically it is not merely the result of a subject’s 
failure to exercise the freedom to act from reason, i.e. from the categorical imperative—the 
view of evil that appeared to follow from Kant’s ethics (Kant’s own efforts to address this 
problem notwithstanding). In that case the subject would not choose evil but would only 
exercise choice at all in acting from the good—which makes our responsibility for evil 
puzzling.  
Instead, then, Schelling insists, evil is something we can positively choose to commit, 
just as alternatively we may choose the good (PUF 23/25). Further, evil must be understood 
actually to tempt or solicit us (41/46). For this to be possible there must be forces within each 
of us that prompt us to commit evil when the occasion arises, even though we also have inner 
forces motivating us to do good, which we can choose to prioritise over the evil ones. In sum, 
doing justice to human freedom requires a picture of human beings as torn between 
competing impulses, never exempt from the attractions of evil. 
 Given that Schelling already took the view that finite things unfold from and manifest 
the absolute one, however, this picture of human agency has ramifications for how the 
absolute must be thought. The absolute must contain within itself something akin to the 
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opposing forces within human agents, so that those forces in their human manifestation are 
explained from the absolute. Thus, the absolute must have within it forces prefiguring those 
of evil and good as the latter exist in human beings. Furthermore, to prefigure the human 
freedom to choose between these forces and to prioritise the good, the absolute must have a 
personal character, anticipating that of the choosing human agent, and anticipating the human 
capacity to do good. So, more robustly than ever before, Schelling equates the absolute with 
the personal, Christian God. 
  But since ‘everything positive [i.e. definitely existing] in creatures comes from God’, 
and since it is also the case that if ‘there is something positive [i.e. a definite force] in evil, 
then this positive comes also from God’, Schelling’s claims seem to entail that evil is in 
God—that God harbours tendencies to evil, even if he always sets his face against them (PUF 
23/26). Not surprisingly, since this would be a very heterodox claim, Schelling argues 
otherwise. Nonetheless there must be something in God that provides the ground of the evil 
tendencies found in human agents. To say this without implying or concluding that God 
contains evil, Schelling argues that this ‘something’ is that in God which is contrary to his 
own nature, which he constantly negates, and indeed through the negation of which he 
becomes himself as the good, personal God. At the same time, Schelling maintains that this 
‘something’ is what God negates within himself—it cannot fall outside of God or he would 
not be the absolute. This ‘something’ is, then, ambiguously both in but not of God: God 
contains an internal opposition. This ‘something’ is God’s ‘ground’ of possibility—that 
which is the condition of his possibility insofar as he must negate it to be himself qua good. 
So whereas God in his existence is good and rational, and creates the world in accordance 
with these traits, his ground by contrast is a more primeval force of generation, which both 
prefigures (makes possible) God’s creativity and is opposed to that creativity in being non-
rational and chaotic. The ground, therefore, is the brute upsurgence by which existence comes 
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forth, a primordial movement through which it becomes possible for there to be anything at 
all (PUF 27/30). 
 Schelling ties this distinction back to his ethical concerns as follows. Evil is not in 
God, because he intrinsically negates his ground; at the same time, he is inseparably united 
with that ground, without which he cannot exist, albeit that this is an antagonistic and not a 
harmonious unity. In the finite, created natural world within which human beings are situated, 
what is united in God becomes unfolded into all its differentiae, all existing outside one 
another. Hence the potential for evil that was in God’s ground comes to exist separately from 
his existent goodness, as a separate force for evil to which human agents are subject along 
with the impulse to the good (PUF 33/36). The capacity for choice, too, becomes a distinct 
faculty in human agents: the faculty to prioritise good or evil. God’s internally complex 
character, then, makes human evil possible without his directly being evil himself—
Schelling’s solution to the age-old problem of evil, which is another of the various problems 
motivating him to the stance embraced in the Freiheitsschrift. 
But what qualifies certain promptings within human beings as evil? Informed by 
Kant, Schelling holds that to act with a good will is to do what is rational and, being rational, 
obtains as a universal law—i.e. to do something that any agent faced with a like situation has 
rational grounds to do, so that if I have a reason to X then so does anyone else facing the 
same options. Conversely, then, to act with an evil will is to turn away from what reason 
legislates and pursue the satisfaction of impulses that I have just as the particular individual I 
am, constituted just as I am, in fact. That is, evil is linked with particular individuality and 
with what just is, sheer contingency—’blind will’ or ‘self-will’ (blinder Wille, Eigenwille 
PUF 32/35). On the divine plane, what prefigures this in God’s ground is the fact that it just 
is, as brute emergence from non-being into being; and that what emerges is just whatever it 
is, in its inexplicable particularity. 
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Thus the ground is non- or irrational, i.e. chaotic—it defies our understanding, for 
there is no reason why it is as it is. The ground exceeds our understanding: ‘This is the 
incomprehensible [unergreifliche] basis of the reality in things, the indivisible remainder, that 
which with even the greatest exertion cannot be resolved into the understanding but remains 
eternally in the ground’ (29/32). And so, as indeed in this passage, Schelling describes the 
ground mainly using metaphorical, poetic language, which is suited to evoke and grope 
towards that which no concepts can cover exhaustively. The language of darkness and light, 
for instance, is pervasive. 
At this point, let me note one final concern that prompted Schelling to develop these 
seemingly esoteric views. Schelling became increasingly convinced that the fact of 
something’s existing can never be guaranteed just by its concept; even if it is in something’s 
concept (as with God) to exist, its actual existence is still something over and above that. 
Something’s concept may tell us that if it exists, then it does so with necessity, but not 
whether it exists at all—whether the concept is instantiated. Thus there is a distinction 
between the sheer facticity of what is and the domain of concepts, and this is encapsulated in 
the distinction between God’s ground and his existence. 
The gendered connotations of Schelling’s concepts are fully explicit. He equates 
God’s ground with the female and, specifically, the maternal body. The ground is persistently 
linked with birth: ‘it is the yearning [Sehnsucht] [that] the eternal One feels to give birth to 
itself [sich selbst zu gebären] … the yearning wants to give birth to [gebären] God’ (28/31). 
And ‘All birth is birth from darkness into light’: seeds come to fruition in the darkness of the 
earth; likewise, the human being is ‘formed in the maternal body [Mutterleibe]; and only 
from the darkness of that which is without understanding (from feeling, yearning, the 
sovereign mother of knowledge) grow luminous thoughts’ (29/32-3). The ground is identified 
as female, then, along a whole series of conceptual contrasts with the existing God, who 
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counts as male because he negates the female ground, in line with Judaeo-Christian tradition.5 
On the one hand, then, we have the ground—what is chaotic and non-rational, a movement of 
brute emergence into existence, marked by a desire or longing for full existence, which feels, 
yet lacks and exceeds understanding. On the other hand, we have God in his full 
personhood—who is rational, who creates in accordance with reason and the good, who fully 
exists, and who guarantees the intelligibility of things in general. 
As in the Outline, in the Freiheitsschrift two powers are again responsible for the 
generation of the cosmos. But in the Outline these were described as forces, in quasi-
scientific language. In the Freiheitsschrift the two powers are instead aspects of God—the 
language is religious. What was pure productivity in the Outline has been reconceived as 
God, as creative agent; what was inhibition is now God’s ground, which turns inward upon 
itself—away from our efforts to comprehend it, and away from God’s existence proper. As 
with inhibition previously, the ground recedes and hides in darkness, whereas God as creative 
existent comes out into the light. 
The distinction between quasi-scientific and theological vocabularies is not sharp as it 
might appear, though. Just as Schelling was always drawn to the Spinozist view of God-or-
nature, in the Freiheitsschrift he identifies God’s ground with nature, so that the ambivalent 
unity of God and his ground is equally that of God and nature. The nature that is the ground is 
not created nature (natura naturata), the product of God’s creation, but creative nature 
(natura naturans). What it contributes to created nature is the latter’s all-pervasive aspect of 
sheer contingency and brute emergence just as it is, in contrast to its intelligibility, which 
descends from God as creative subject. 
As this indicates, although the ground is a descendant of the earlier notion of 
inhibition, there are also palpable shifts in how the ground is understood compared to 
inhibition. Inhibition was necessary for the production of natural forms, but inhibition was 
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not itself directly productive, but rather contributed to production by retarding and limiting 
pure productive force. This still meant that inhibition was a force, exercising limiting power 
with respect to productivity; but inhibition was not directly a productive force. In the 
Freiheitsschrift, though, the ground is generative, directly so; its generativity makes it 
possible for God to exercise creative agency, which he does in realising more fully the 
generative movement into existence in which the ground already consisted. In this way, 
God’s creativity depends more deeply on the ground than productivity depended on 
inhibition. Productivity could operate without inhibition in principle, but it needed inhibition 
to produce anything determinate. In contrast, God’s creativity can only arise and operate at all 
as the realisation of the generative power already latent in the ground. In this sense, we might 
think that the female principle has gained a new level of power and importance relative to its 
male counterpart. This gain partly reflects Schelling’s increasingly conviction that 
considerations of reason are secondary to facts of pure existence, which, given his broad 
associations male-reason/female-existence, shifts the ‘female’ side of the equation into prime 
position. Yet we may well still be dissatisfied with Schelling’s assumptions about gender, for 
a number of reasons, to which I now turn. 
 
III. Gendered values in Schelling’s thought and its contemporary uses 
There are several problems with Schelling's assumptions about gender. First, there is his 
equation of the female with the maternal in the Freiheitsschrift. Second, there is the 
association of the female with the non-rational and of the male with the rational, as well as 
the preservation of the traditional Judeo-Christian belief in a male God. Third, there is the 
fact that the female ground, although not itself evil, is the condition of possibility of evil, 
which is an active, tempting force within human agents. Although the alignment is 
complicated and nuanced, the fact remains that the female is broadly aligned with evil here, 
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whereas the male is broadly aligned with good through the connections between God, the 
good and reason. Once again, these alignments show the influence of Plato’s Timaeus: 
Now it appears that the solicitation to evil itself can only come from an evil 
fundamental being [Grundwesen], and the assumption that there is such a being seems 
nonetheless unavoidable; it also appears that that interpretation of Platonic matter is 
completely correct according to which matter is originally a kind of being that resists 
God and that for that reason is an evil being in itself. (41/46) 
Schelling goes on to tell us that he does not entirely agree, for he neither regards matter (nor 
the ground) as a being entirely outside God nor regards the ground as in itself actually evil; 
nonetheless, as he is indicating in the above quotation, he is informed by Plato, even as he 
qualifies Plato’s position.  
Should anyone be tempted to dismiss all this as mere metaphor from which 
Schelling’s key concepts can be extracted, we should remember that metaphor is integral to 
Schelling’s description of the ground insofar as it defies conceptual understanding. Without 
metaphor and imagination we would have no notion of the ground at all. And amongst these 
metaphors, those of birth and the maternal body are central. 
By this point, it may seem as if Schelling has a straightforwardly hierarchical 
conception of the two sexes. The female potential for and proclivity towards evil remain just 
that—mere potential and unrealised proclivity—as long as they are contained within 
structures whereby God and the human agent negate them. That is: the female carries the 
seeds of evil, but as long as it is subordinated underneath the male the danger can be averted.  
However, Schelling is actually ambiguous on the value of the two sexes. His thought does 
have hierarchical implications yet, on the other hand, there is the thought that the female 
ground is necessarily prior to male existence, and that the most primordial kind of production 
is female generation as distinct from male creation. For this reason Assiter (2015) views 
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Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift positively, as a recovery of the forgotten power of female birth-
giving. Moreover, whereas in the Outline the female was not itself productive, in the 
Freiheitsschrift it is. And although the female is aligned with unreason and with what just 
emerges, by the same token brute facticity is given priority to reason and understanding: 
something must first exist before it can conform or fail to conform to concepts. To be sure, 
Schelling does not challenge the traditional set of conceptual oppositions with which he is 
working—those of female-irrational-nature-evil versus male-reason-subjectivity-good. But to 
some extent he reverses the hierarchy in which these were traditionally placed, i.e. where the 
male had been ranked ‘above’ the female. Schelling goes some way towards reversing that 
ranking, by affirming that the ‘female’ set of elements has ontological priority. 
To complicate matters further, though, Schelling regularly draws back from giving 
this priority to the female side of the equation. For instance, having just stated that ‘God has 
in himself an inner ground of his existence that in this respect precedes him in existence’ [my 
emphasis], he then adds ‘but, precisely in this way, God is again the prius of the ground in so 
far as the ground, even as such, could not exist if God did not exist actu’ (PUF 28/31). That 
is, the ground is that in God without which he could not exist, a ground which, therefore, 
would not be possible if God did not exist, for it is part of him, albeit part of him that turns 
away from him and against which he sets himself. Accordingly, Schelling states that God 
alone is ‘begotten from himself’ (er allein ist von sich selbst; 29/32).  
 On the positive side, then, Schelling consistently recognises female elements in the 
cosmos. In the Outline, he maintains that a female principle is necessary alongside the male 
one in the generation of the world. And in the Freiheitsschrift he goes further, albeit with 
some qualifications, in giving central importance to the maternal body and to the female 
principle of birth-giving. Indeed, the Freiheitsschrift tends towards the thought that the 
female and maternal principle is the most fundamental one metaphysically. On the negative 
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side, Schelling does not challenge the gendered oppositions with which he works; at most he 
reverses the respective values assigned to the male and female sides of these oppositions. At 
other times he falls back towards seeing the female as needing subordination under the male 
principle if anarchy is to be averted. Plausibly, these drawbacks of his way of thinking are 
connected. If one tries to revalue the associated terms female-unreason-body-matter-evil 
(etc.) but does not challenge their association or their opposition to the series male-reason-
mind-good (etc.), then it will be difficult to revalue the female terms consistently in the first 
place. For their sedimented meanings include that of being inferior to their male 
counterparts—meanings, therefore, that will inevitably tend to seep back into one’s attempted 
more positive picture. 
 To illustrate how these issues bear on contemporary readings of Schelling, let me 
briefly turn to Zizek. One of the ways he uses the core concepts of Schelling’s 
Freiheitsschrift is to transpose them into the political domain, for example in his essay ‘A 
Leftist Plea for “Eurocentrism”’ (Zizek 1998). Schelling is not overtly mentioned here, 
beyond one use of the phrase ‘the indivisible remainder’ and Zizek’s references to his own 
earlier book on Schelling (Zizek 1996). But implicitly the Freiheitsschrift is pervasive. Zizek 
argues that politics proper requires a traumatic break from the established horizon of 
meaning, order and intelligibility, a break in which a hitherto excluded or subordinated group 
asserts that it is the universal—the people, the demos, the republic, the nation, the whole 
society, etc. (989). That is, we have here a group that is external to and opposed to the 
existing order and yet is internally necessary to the workings of that order—which thus 
occupies the position of the ground, the ‘non-part’, vis-à-vis the existing order, where the 
latter is equivalent to God’s realm of intelligible order. The political moment is one in which 
this excluded group, excessive with respect to the order of the time, erupts and re-defines 
what counts as intelligibility and order. But this transformative agency does not reject 
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intelligibility or order; it instead re-shapes the latter, by declaring itself to be the universal. 
Thus, Zizek is adamant that genuine politics must concern the universal, and so he sets 
himself against ‘postmodern multi-culturalism’ and ‘identity politics’ which affirm the 
particularity of different groups—including women—and so which, by his lights, are 
symptomatic of the depoliticisation of the present time (1006-7). 
 We can see here that Zizek takes up Schelling’s accordance of ontological priority to 
the ground: the ground, a.k.a. the excluded group, must burst forth for politics proper to 
become possible. But, and again in a way faithful to Schelling’s framework, Zizek holds that 
the ground on its own is not enough to yield politics. Politics arises only once where the 
irruptive potential of the ground is taken up into existence, in the form of a claim to 
universality. This taking-up leaves a remainder—i.e. there is a fundamental antagonism 
between the particularity of the group and its claim to universality (or, between God’s ground 
and existence)—but that antagonistic unity is nonetheless key to politics. 
 The gendered connotations of Schelling’s ground/existence contrast feed through into 
Zizek’s dismissal of ‘multi-culturalism’ and feminism considered as a form of identity 
politics. Reflecting the original female connotation of the ground, Zizek associates 
particularity on its own, i.e. a-political particularity, with the ‘multi-cultural’ project and with 
the affirmation of feminine values and women’s particular interests and needs. On the other 
hand, and reflecting the original male connotation of God as creative existence, the 
affirmation of a universal community is celebrated for being ‘properly political’. To be sure, 
it is properly political only when it incorporates a ‘female’ dimension, in that an excluded 
particular proclaims itself to be universal. But, at the same time, that ‘female’ dimension only 
becomes political once it is incorporated into a structure that includes ‘male’ universality. In 
sum, Zizek adheres to an age-old set of associations female-particular-private/male-universal-
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political. Old as these associations are, they re-appear in Zizek’s framework by virtue of his 
taking up the already-gendered ideas of God and his ground from Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift. 
 To conclude, I have tried to show that gendered meanings are woven integrally into 
Schelling’s thought. If we take up Schelling’s ideas, even by creatively transposing them 
from metaphysical to political registers as Zizek does, then we are liable to take up their 
gendered meanings at the same time. Some might be unconcerned by this, but I believe that 
we need to be critical of these sedimented meanings. A first step towards re-thinking them is 
to study how they function in Schelling’s thought. Doing this can also help us to make sense 
of Schelling’s ideas more generally, insofar as gendered connotations are thoroughly woven 
into these ideas. In this case, I hope to have illuminated continuities between Schelling’s 
philosophy of nature and his Freiheitsschrift, continuities that become visible once we attend 
to gender. Both for critical feminist purposes and for purposes of exegesis and understanding, 
examination of the gendered aspects of Schelling’s thinking ought to form a vital part of 
contemporary efforts to reconstruct and appropriate his philosophy. 
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